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The paper introduces a computational model of airspace conflict risk in the hierarchy of
performance-based navigation (PBN) airspace operation and combines it with air traffic
controller (ATC) workload to propose a method for safety assessment of PBN airspace
operational planning. Capacity probability distribution is employed to depict airspace ca-
pacity in uncertain weather, errors of deviating from nominal PBN track are taken into
consideration, and the stochastic process based on Gaussian distribution is used to depict
random aircraft motion according to airspace PBN specification, so as to build an airspace
conflict risk computational model in corresponding capacity scenario. Guangzhou No. 15
sector is chosen for simulation validation. The analysis results suggest that 60% of ATC
workload is corresponding to sector traffic flow of 31 aircraft/h and airspace risk of 0.018
conflict/h, while 70% of ATC workload is corresponding to sector traffic flow of 35 aircraft/h
and airspace risk of 0.03 conflict/h. As air traffic flow increases, both airspace conflict risk
value and ATC workload will increase, resulting in reduction of airspace safety, though
their increasing magnitudes differ with different capacity scenarios. The safety assessment
method enables effective quantization of safety with regard to airspace operational plan-
ning strategy, and benefits the development of optimal operational scheme that balances
risk with capacity demand.
© 2015 Periodical Offices of Chang'an University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on
behalf of Owner. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In the time of increasingly busy air transportation today,
conventional navigation based airspace structure is verysportation Systems Rese
.
al Offices of Chang'an Un
'an University. Production
se (http://creativecommodifficult to meet the requirement of increasing flight volume.
Flight delay occurs quite often indicating a desperate need of
optimization design of current airspace in China. The perfor-
mance-based navigation (PBN) is a novel operational concept
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technical standards of country-specific area navigation
(RNAV) and Required Navigation Performance (RNP), enabling
effective improvements of airspace resource utilization,
airspace capacity and safety. The international aviation
community even regards PBN as one of the cornerstones of
future air navigation system. According to China's strategy of
reinvigorating the country through civil aviation, Civil Avia-
tion Administration of China (CAAC) plans to implement PBN
technology in en-route phase during the Twelfth Five-Year
Plan period.
Safety is a critical issue as to whether an airspace planning
scheme can be efficiently implemented or not. Safety assess-
ment is capable of providing valid feedback information for
planning, efficiently of preventing aircraft from having such
hazards as conflict and collision. Therefore, airspace planning
has to be built on the basis of safety assessment. Depending on
different phases of air traffic management (ATM), airspace
planning can be divided into strategic, tactical and operational
hierarchies. Factors considered gradually increase with hier-
archies and the corresponding safety assessment method
varies somewhat, evaluation model has become more
complicated. Safety assessment of airspaceplanning in various
hierarchies is an important task to ensure air traffic safety.
In light of this, the scholars worldwide have conducted
numerous researches. Reich (1966a, 1966b, 1966c) established
the theory of aircraft collision model, firstly proposing the
Reich collision risk model. Hsu (1981) put forward a concept of
critical collision zone and studied aircraft collision risks on
intersecting routes using conditional probability method,
namely the modified Reich model. Cox et al. (1991), Harrison
and Moek (1992), Moek et al. (1993) employed Reich model to
study collision risks at places including North Atlantic
Ocean, and analyzed probability of reducing safety
separation. Brooker (2002a, 2002b) analyzed separation
safety from perspective of accident analysis, studied current
separation safety assessment and collision risk models, and
proposed the event model (Brooker, 2003, 2004a, 2004b,
2006). Netjasov (2012a, 2012b, 2013) proposed a conflict risk
evaluation model for airspace strategic planning with
conflict probability and number of conflicts giving the
minimum flight safety separation. Domestic studies in this
field started later, Zhao (1998) studied number of dangerous
conflicts occurring on aircraft at two intersecting air routes.
Ying and Xu (2002) and Xu et al. (2008) employed Reich
model to study the issue of safety assessment of separation
criterion at parallel routes in oceanic area and built the
event model based on collision cylinder. Han et al. (2006)
improved the collision risk model under the condition of
radar separation and proposed a computational model at
radar control separation where it is necessary for air traffic
controller to intervene any flight conflict with or without
non-intrusion zone. The researches on airspace safety
assessment worldwide primarily started from collision risk,
focusing on collision risk model and safety separation
determination, but there were only fewer studies focusing
on conflict risk. Moreover, they mainly used two routes, not
applying their researches to all airspace planning cases,
such as ad-hoc sectorization (Zhang et al., 2007, 2009; Meng
et al., 2010; Zhou et al., 2014).In this paper, weather uncertainty factor and error of
aircraft flight deviating from PBN nominal track are taken into
account for airspace planning operational hierarchy. Actual
track is simulated using stochasticmethod based on Gaussian
distribution, thereby random airspace conflict risk in corre-
sponding capacity scenario is studied. With ATC workload as
an indicator to represent human factor impact, a method for
safety assessment of PBN airspace operational planning is
proposed, thereby different airspace design and organiza-
tional scenarios are compared and validated through
computation of test cases.2. Problem description
During actual aircraft operations, flight safety will be subject
to such factors as complexity of air route structure and fea-
tures of traffic flow in airspace. While the PBN specification is
selected, weather change and human factor would further
increase uncertainty of flight safety. If PBN specifications
selected varies, then errors of deviating from nominal track
would differ somewhat; occurrence of adverse weather would
aggravate the difficulty of pilot operation, directly impairing
the flight safety. Meanwhile, weather change leads to uncer-
tainty of airspace capacity. Once airspace capacity decreases,
congestion phenomenonwould appear, resulting in increased
ATC workload. If the load exceeds affordable ATC load limit,
the response rate and air control efficiency of an air traffic
controller would decrease dramatically, and it would be too
late to control some aircraft in “potentially dangerous conflict
state”, resulting in potential safety hazard.
What has bean considered in this paper is the safety
assessment method in airspace operational planning hierar-
chy, such assessment usually lasts a week, so information
about aircraft type and traffic flow in airspace is certain. This
model mainly combines airspace conflict risk and ATC work-
load to compare various operational scenarios of airspace, so
as to balance airspace conflict risk and traffic flow demand,
which are beneficial to developing a flight plan with low risk
and high traffic flow and to enabling air traffic flow assign-
ment in case of uncertain weather. The model can be used in
PBN airspace operational planning stages, such as discrimi-
nating the responsibilities of an air traffic controller from
those of a pilot, ad-hoc adjustment of flight plan and dynamic
sectorization. To simplify the model, the following assump-
tions are adopted.
(1) When an aircraft flies in a PBN airspace, its error of
deviating from nominal track follows Gaussian
distribution.
(2) Conflict risk value is not a constant, but is related to
airspace structure and weather information, etc.
(3) Influences of on-board devices and others on conflict
risk are disregarded.3. Safety assessment model
The model proposed in this paper makes safety assessment
from macroscopic perspective. With the combination of
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indicator, the safety assessment model can be used to aid in
selection of decision strategy in airspace operational planning
stage, reduce airspace risk and to balance traffic flow. The
model framework is shown in Fig. 1. Conflict risks mainly
depend on the airspace structure, adopted PBN specification,
safety separation setting and weather change, among which
weather change and PBN derived navigation error are the
most important factors of airspace operational uncertainty.
Therefore, it is necessary to take control of weather-derived
capacity change and simulate yaw error, so as to study
airspace risk and ATC workload in case of capacity
uncertainty, which is an effective support tool for expert
operational decision.
3.1. Capacity probability distribution curve
Usually, a capacity probability distribution curve can express
the relationship between capacity and its corresponding
probability (Clarke et al., 2013). This paper utilizes the capacity
probability distribution curve to calculate the average airspace
capacity of every weather scenario, build mapping of airspace
average capacity versus weather scenario, and to obtain the
average capacity probability distribution curve. With PBN
navigation error, airspace traffic flow in the weather
scenario is simulated to generate actual track and detect the
conflict, and then to obtain airspace conflict risk value in
case of uncertain weather.
In the entire safety assessmentmodel, the average capacity
probability distribution curve ismainly used to depict airspace
capacity uncertainty, enable real and vivid reflection ofFig. 1 e Schematic of safety assweather impact on airspace capacity, and facilitate analysis of
conflict risk inuncertain airspace. As illustrated in Fig. 2, owing
to the uncertainty of weather change, a certain probability of
occurrence exists in each type of weather scenario for the
corresponding airspace capacity. In regard to airspace
capacity probability distribution curve, its building process
mainly consists of weather scenario generation and random
capacity determination. The capacity distribution is obtained
through analysis of history data using K-means clustering or
through computer simulation.
By analyzing the capacity probability distribution curve
each type of weather scenarios, the average airspace capacity
in a certain weather scenario R is calculated as follow
R ¼
Z
RPdt (1)
where P denotes the probability of capacity in certain weather
scenario, R is the average capacity. There are several kinds of
weather scenarios in each time slice. There is a certain proba-
bility for each weather scenario, hence a correspondence of
weather scenario probability and airspace average capacity can
be created. As illustrated in Fig. 3, probability of weather
scenario A occurrence is P1, while the airspace average
capacity is R1. That is to say, the probability of capacity R1
occurrence is P1 (airspace average capacity varies with weather
scenario), and the sumofall capacity scenarios probabilities is 1.
3.2. Assessment of PBN airspace conflict risk
In airspace operational planning stage, the flight plan is
known. When weather change makes capacity decrease so asessment model framework.
Fig. 2 e Schematic of capacity probability distribution
curve.
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signed according to capacity constraint. Throughout the pro-
cess of computing airspace conflict risk, the traffic flow is
firstly simulated in a fixed airspace with consideration of PBN
navigation specification, so as to generate actual track devi-
ating from nominal track, and the number of aircraft conflicts
in this run of simulation is calculated using conflict detection
method, which is then combined with weather scenario
occurrence probability to obtain airspace conflict risk value in
this capacity scenario.
3.2.1. Prediction of actual track
Actual track of aircraft flying is often subject to uncertain
factors such as PBN navigation specification used, crosswind,
etc., thus actual track often deviates from nominal track and
follows a certain rule. In this paper, influences of PBN navi-
gation on actual track are taken into account. The formula of
actual track is shown as follow
d Xt
! ¼ vt!dtþ st!dt (2)
where Xt
!
denotes the position of aircraft at time t, vt
! denotes
the speed of aircraft at time t, st
!denotes the error of aircraft at
time t. All the above parameters are three-dimensional
vectors.
The PBN type for en-route operation is established ac-
cording to navigation performance accuracies in horizontal
plane (i.e., lateral and longitudinal navigation accuracies), and
its performance parameters include accuracy, availability,
continuity and integrity. Among the performance parameters,
accuracy is an immediate factor causing yaw of aircraftFig. 3 e Average capacity probability distribution curve.position. Since PBN usually depicts airspace properties via
navigation accuracy, the PBN accuracy derived aircraft yaw
error is primarily considered in this paper.
As defined, PBN mainly consists of two specifications,
RNAV and RNP. Accuracies of RNAV and RNP specifications
can be expressed as accuracy values guaranteeing that an
aircraft is capable of achieving expected navigation perfor-
mance on an airspace or route within 95% of airspace flight
period. The total navigation system error in any single flight
must not exceed the specified RNP type for 95% of the flight
time on any portion of the flight. In the event that flight pro-
cedure navigation specifications are RNAV-n and RNP-n. Since
the horizontal trajectory error follows Gaussian distribution, it
can be known that total systematic errors of longitudinal and
lateral navigations are
exn  N

0;
 n
1:96
2
; eyn  N

0;
 n
1:96
2
(3)
As to the vertical error of an aircraft flying as per PBN
procedure, it is not stipulated in ICAO and PBNmanuals. Here
it can be assumed to conform to general empirical vertical
navigation error ezn. Thereby aircraft position at time t can be
determined as follow
Xt
! ¼
Z t
0
vt
!dtþ
Z t
0
st
!dt ¼
Z t
0
vt
!dtþ exn; eyn; eznT (4)
3.2.2. Conflict detection
In the case of aircraft en-route flight, conflicts consist of the
conflict between aircraft and adverse weather and the conflict
between aircrafts from perspective of conflict object and from
perspective of space. Conflicts mainly include horizontal
conflict and vertical conflict. The vertical conflict can be
identified with vertical separation, whereas horizontal con-
flict is more complex and will be predominantly discussed
below. The conflict between aircraft and adverse weather is
mainly controlled by separation limits, where information of
adverse weather can be obtained from CAACweather forecast
and radar reflection. When an aircraft is flying in adverse
weather, the space for turn and withdrawal must be taken
into account. To reduce the impact of adverse weather on
aircraft, a concept of flight-restricted zone is developed. In
consideration of adverse weather information and compli-
ance with current regulation allowing aircraft to fly around in
China, flight-restricted zone is obtained, which is an irregular
geometric shape from perspective of horizontal plane, as
shown in Fig. 4.
An aircraft in adverse weather needs tomeet certain safety
separation in space, that is, the aircraft is refrained from
admitting into the irregular-shaped flight-restricted zone due
to adverseweather, as shown in Fig. 5. The radius of the safety
zone is a larger size between the aircraft fuselage and
wingspan.
As trajectory of aircraft i extends at speed v!i to cross the
flight-restricted zone, aircraft i would conflict with adverse
weather and has to fly around. Every aircraft has a circular
safety zone, which has to be beyond the flight-restricted zone.
The slopes of tangent lines between the aircraft safety zone
and flight-restricted zone relative to their intersecting line are
Fig. 5 eWeather safety separation.
Fig. 4 e Schematic of flight-restricted zone position.
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i;f , respectively. To guarantee flight safety, aircraft i
and the flight-restricted zone have to satisfy the following
conditions.
v!i;y  v!i;xkpi;f ; v!i;x  0 (5)
or v!i;y  v!i;xkni;f ; v!i;x  0 (6)
or v!i;x  0 (7)
The trajectories between aircrafts have to meet separation
limit too, similar to the case of adverse weather, as shown in
Fig. 6. Every aircraft safety zone is a circular area, and aircraft i
and j have to satisfy the following condition.
v!i;j;y  v!i;j;xkpi;j; v!i;j;x  0 (8)
or v!i;j;y  v!i;j;xkni;j; v!i;j;x  0 (9)
or v!i;j;x  0 (10)
3.2.3. Calculation of conflict risk
There exists a certain probability in forecast of future weather
due to weather uncertainty. In this paper, update cycle ofFig. 6 e Aircraft safety zone.weather information is t, weather capacity scenarios obtained
in various update cycles are denoted as set M ¼ {1, /, m}, of
which element m contains three variables, m ¼ (Am, Pm, Rm),
where Am denotes weather type, Pm denotes probability of
weather scenario Am occurring, Rm denotes corresponding
airspace capacity of weather scenario Am. By means of Monte
Carlo simulation, number Nm of conflicts can be obtained in
case of weather scenario Am, where Nm is a discrete variable
expressed as follow
Nm 

0 N1 N2 / Nm
0 P1 P2 / Pm

(11)
Xm
k¼0
Pk ¼ 1; Rm 

0 R1 R2 / Rm
0 P1 P2 / Pm

In order to assess severity of airspace conflict risk, this
paper defines that conflict risk value C is the number of con-
flicts probably occurring per hour. Unlike collision risk value,
which evaluates the collision risk, conflict risk value mainly
evaluates the conflict risk.
ci ¼ NiPi (12)
C ¼
Xm
i¼1
ci ¼
Xm
i¼1
NiPi (13)
where ci denotes corresponding airspace conflict risk value in
weather scenario Ai, C denotes total conflict risk value in
airspace at time t.3.3. Assessment of ATC workload
During assessment, human factor is extremely important.
The human factor in this paper is embodied by ATCworkload.
As airspace traffic flow rises, both the number of conflicts and
ATC workload increase. But their growth trends are different.
To balance traffic flow and airspace safety risks, experts can
make decisions according to the relationship among conflict
risk value, traffic flow, and ATC workload, and choose the
appropriate traffic flow and acceptable degree of airspace
safety risk.
The job of air traffic controllers is mainly divided into three
types, communication, non-communication and thinking.
The communication-type job includes receiving aircraft,
adjusting aircraft altitude and speed, radar vectoring aircraft,
and offering meteorological intelligence. The non-communi-
cation-type job includes monitoring aircraft, seeking flight
progress strip, and filling in flight progress strip. The thinking-
type job includes computing aviation elements and devel-
oping preliminary conflict solution. Since ATC workload in
this paper is obtained on the basis of simulation, conflict
might be present. In order to highlight the impact of conflict
on load, ATC workload is computed at two stages. One is to
compute basic air control load, which is the workload un-
avoidable under the condition of certain airspace structure
and air control rule, however, conflict situation in airspace
changes, which is a linear relationship with traffic flow in the
airspace. The other is to reallocate computation of air control
load, which is the workload resulting from resolving flight
Fig. 7 e Geometric distribution of sector routes in adverse
weather.
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air control condition.
Total sector workload within time slice t is expressed as
follow
WðtÞ ¼
Xs
j¼0
WjðtÞ ¼
Xs
j¼0

Wstj ðtÞ þWdyj ðtÞ

(14)
where W(t) denotes total ATC workload within time slice t,
Wj(t) denotes total ATCworkload on route jwithin time slice t,
Wstj ðtÞ denotes basic air control load on route j within time
slice t, Wdyj ðtÞ denotes reallocated air control load on route j
within time slice t.
Depending on the reallocation method at conflict onset,
reallocation of air control load can be generally divided into
three types, altitude reallocation, speed reallocation and di-
rection reallocation (Wan and Hu, 2006), corresponding to
different reallocated air control loads respectively, the
calculation formula is shown as follow
Wdysjt ðtÞ ¼ ththj þ tvtvj þ tdtdj (15)
where th denotes weight of altitude-reallocation-type air
control load, tv denotes weight of speed-reallocation-type air
control load, td denotes weight of direction-reallocation-type
air control load, thj denotes number of altitude reallocation
operations in air control on route j within time slice t, tvj de-
notes number of speed reallocation operations in air control
on route j within time slice t, tdj denotes number of direction
reallocation operations in air control on route j within time
slice t.Table 1 e Distribution of en-route traffic flow.
Name of route Ratio of
air traffic
flow (%)
Name of route Ratio of
air traffic
flow (%)
ZF-LKO-GOSMA 5.9 YIH-HZ-WHA 9.3
GOSMA-LKO-ZF 6.6 DA-HZ-LIN 1.4
ZF-LKO-DAPRO 26.9 LIN-HZ-DA 1.8
DAPRO-LKO-ZF 24.9 WHA-LIN 2.5
WHA-HZ-YIH 8.1 LIN-WHA 1.4
DA-HZ-YIH 1.6 XSH-DA-LKO-GOSMA 0.9
GOSMA-LKO-WHA 1.1 YIH-HZ-XSH 1.1
DAPRO-LKO-WHA 1.3 LKO-DAPRO 2.5
DAPRO-LKO 1.8 WHA-LKO-GOSMA 0.94. Analysis of computational example
Guangzhou No. 15 sector in central south China region is a
typical busy flight sector in China, where there aremany route
intersecting points and a lot of potential conflicts. In this
paper, this sector model is chosen for simulation validation.
This sector is often subject to weather conditions. In
particular, occurrence of bumpy weather would result in
many flight levels unavailable. One day in 2013, SIGMET
message was received predicting bumpy weather. Based on
message information and radar detection, the flight-restricted
zone position is illustrated in Fig. 7. This study covers time
range from UTC 0900 to UTC 1000, take 1 h as one time slice,
in which there are 5 capacity scenarios. Capacity probability
distribution could be obtained using the reference method
due to weather uncertainty (Clarke et al., 2013), expressed as
follow
Rm 

0 R1 R2 / Rm
0 P1 P2 / Pm



0 10 20 30 40 50
0 0:01 0:03 0:54 0:35 0:07

The en-route aircraft in the sector are primarily of type C,
with a speed of 720 km/h. The PBN specification adopted by
the routes is RNAV 2, while traffic flow distribution of each
route is shown in Table 1.
From analysis of route structure and air traffic flow distri-
bution, it is known that the conflicts are mainly convergingconflicts occurring at LKO and HZ. In air traffic control, the
empirical value of ATC safety separation is 15 km or 20 km,
which in this paper will be set at 10, 15 and 20 km, respec-
tively, to facilitate model comparison and validation. When
aircraft safety separation is 10 km, the number of conflicts
corresponding to capacity is obtained through Monte Carlo
simulation. Conflict probability distribution is expressed as
follow
Nm 

0 N1 N2 / Nm
0 P1 P2 / Pm



0 0:0048 0:0053 0:0184 0:0460 0:0508
0 0:01 0:03 0:54 0:35 0:07

Calculation using Eqs. (12) and (13) yields the total sector
conflict risk value, 0.03 times/h. In the simulation, route
structure derived conflict impact is mainly considered, hence
rear-ended conflict is disregarded. Now capacity scenarios 1,
2, 3 and 4 are selected for analysis and their corresponding
sector capacities are 10, 20, 30 and 40 aircraft/h, so that con-
flict risk values and ATC workload values at various safety
separations and various capacity scenarios can be obtained,
as shown in Fig. 8. As airspace traffic flow rises, the number of
conflicts and ATC workload increase accordingly. Meanwhile,
Fig. 8 e Relationship among traffic flow, conflict risk value and ATC workload. (a) Curves of traffic flow versus conflict risk
value. (b) Curve of traffic flow versus ATC workload. (c) Curves of conflict risk value versus ATC workload.
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number of conflicts. The less the conflicts, the less the
deployment of control load. So the basic control load is as
the main part which is a linear relationship with the traffic
flow. Increased number of conflicts and ATC workload will
result in increased airspace safety risk. To balance traffic
flow and airspace safety risks, experts can make decisions
according to the relationship among conflict risk value,
traffic flow, and ATC workload, and choose appropriate
traffic flow and acceptable degree of airspace safety risk. As
shown in Fig. 8, 60% of ATC workload correspond to sector
traffic flow of 31 aircraft/h and airspace risk of 0.018 conflict/
h, while 70% of ATC workload correspond to sector traffic
flow of 35 aircraft/h and airspace risk of 0.03 conflict/h. At
present, ICAO has no quantitative indicator with regard to
conflict risk, by referring to CAAC Air Traffic Safety
Assessment & Management Methods and risk probability
classification table in ICAO Doc 9859 Safety Management
Manual. It is known that when airspace conflict risk is no
less than 1  103/h, the risk level is level 1, conflicts are
frequent; when both schemes are compared, if ATC
workload and airspace risk are expected low, the former
scheme can be chosen; if airspace operational efficiency is
expected to increase, the latter scheme can be chosen;
choice of strategy relates with how individual expert accepts
safety and traffic flow. Furthermore, to mitigate impact of
ATC workload, experts can take such measurement as
reallocate responsibilities of air traffic controller and pilot or
implementing dynamic sectorization strategy, which canbalance the sector control load and reduce the risk of high
load sectors airspace.5. Conclusions
This paper proposes a safety assessment model for PBN
airspace operational planning. This model takes the weather
uncertainty factor into account, identifies capacity scenarios
with the capacity probability distribution, and studies conflict
risks in various capacity scenarios. In the consideration of the
error of aircraft deviating from nominal track when flying
along the nominal track in every PBN flight procedure, the
stochastic process based onGaussian distribution is employed
to depict random aircraft motion derived from PBN specifi-
cation, meanwhile ATC workload is served as an indicator in
view of human factor, airspace safety is further assessed, and
finally this method is validated with is test case. The compu-
tational results suggest that, the greater the airspace conflict
risk value, the higher the ATC workload, and the worse the
airspace safety. In the operational planning, flight safety can
be improved by adopting strategies such as changing safety
separation, reducing air traffic flow and dynamic
sectorization.
Themodel proposed in this papermainly assesses airspace
safety in view of providing decision support for PBN airspace
planning. It can be used to aid developing a rational airspace
operational scheme to balance the conflict risk and flight
j o u rn a l o f t r a ffi c a nd t r an s p o r t a t i o n e n g i n e e r i n g ( e n g l i s h e d i t i o n ) 2 0 1 5 ; 2 ( 5 ) : 3 3 8e3 4 5 345demand, and further to provide a theoretical basis for future
PBN airspace planning based on the safety assessment.
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